. . . --Geo Throws Down. The Title box won't let you fill in to the length of the box. Harrumph. Harrumph harrumph.

Issue #21 of The Heinlein Journal contains "Rational Anarchy: An Analysis of the theme given by Professor Bernardo de la Paz in Robert A. Heinlein's _The Moon is a Harsh Mistress_" by David Wright, Sr.

In this otherwise excellent piece, I am here, with chin out and eye glinted, to dispute a paragraph.

Here it is:

"de la Paz also claims later that Thomas Jefferson was one of the first 'rational anarchists'. This claim, however, appears to be something of an exaggeration, as Jefferson was a Classical Liberal, and his political philosophy matches the definition above only in that he also believed in the 'natural reasoning' capability of the individual".

Ummm, no. No, no, no. Jefferson was a "Classical Liberal", but that is not all he was.

Let's start with an obvious, tho unspoken, corollary with Bernardo de la Paz. Both of them were willing to put their lives on the line for their beliefs. They were Revolutionaries. Bernardo had been "transported" for his beliefs (and there is no reason to think he hadn't expected worse). Jefferson had every reason to think he might have been hung for his during the American Revolution. And maybe even, under the American Republic, jailed at a later date.

Doubt that latter? Read up on the Sedition Laws of the Adams administration, and why they were instituted. They lead to the painful break between Adams and Jefferson that (thankfully) was finally repaired in the last years of their lives. In a nutshell, Adams and his party instituted them to stop pro-French Revolution agitating in the US. Who was prominently on the other side of that agitation? Jefferson.

Is there something about "Rational Anarchism" that demands that kind of willingness to that kind of personal sacrifice and commitment more so than, say, current Republocratism, or traditional "Classical Liberalism"? I would insist there is. The "personal responsibility" component of Rational Anarchism in fact requires that kind of personal commitment in a way that "Classical Liberalism" arguably does not. If the individual is personally responsible, then the individual is. . . personally responsible. Full stop.

Said another way, a willingness to pursure Revolution when the individual thinks it necessary is an inherent and inseparable part of Rational Anarchy. Jefferson's credentials on that point are impeccable.

Let's look at some of Jefferson's other statements, writing for himself rather than whatever discretion "writing for the group" in the Declaration of Independence may have imposed on him.

1). Jefferson wrote that the Tree of Liberty must be manured on occasion with the blood of tyrants and patriots.

2). Jefferson wrote that he'd rather have a country with a free press and no government than a strong government and no free press.

3). Jefferson wrote that in his opinion there was merit in the idea of "sunsetting" every law at 25 years on the grounds that the dead hand of the past should not bind the current generation.

4). Jefferson was a proponent of the idea of "Republican virtue" being seated in the beau ideal of the independant farmer (there are slavery issues here, alas, but while willing to address them if required, I'll avoid them for the moment to avoid lengthy digression).

So, in turn:

1) Is the statement of a Revolutionary. Also the statement that Robert "No Final Victories" Heinlein would resonate with quite sympathetically --it inherently recognizes that no form of government is immortal in its efficacy. It is the statement of a man who is remarkably unnostalgic and unimpressed by the claims of "tradition" on loyalty. It works or it doesn't work --a form of government works or it doesn't work anymore, and if it doesn't, get rid of it without looking back! To have such an opinion, you must be seating the idea of social responsibility somewhere else other than the form of government. That "someplace else" must be individual responsibility for the good of society.

2) It is a trueism of modern economics that efficient markets rely on efficient distribution of knowledge. In other words, you get the best price because you shop around. You invest or you don't invest, efficiently, because of how much information you have. Heck, the laws against "insider trading" are in fact a reflection of the importance of this factor --they are an attempt to say it is "no fair" for some to make money based on information denied to others.

Jefferson's idea here is exactly the same, applied to politics. Information is power. Information available to who? The individual, to whom the concept of "Rational Anarchism" relies. Without a Free Press, Rational Anarchism becomes a much harder proposition upon which to base a whole society.

3) Again, remarkable unsentimentality for tradition. And a great reliance on the individual of the current day to restudy all relevant issues and take proactive action for the good of society rather than relying on "well, them old guys were smart, they probably had the right of it".

4). The independent farmer of Jefferson's time, certainly in the Virginia he was familiar with (a somewhat different model could be pointed at in New England), was nearly an independant satrapy, close to self-sufficent. This is the ultimate in Rational Anarchy to my view, as it required and expected full understanding of. . . everything. "Specialization is for Insects" can find its pre-cursor here as well.

So, no, it is not an exaggeration to call Jefferson a "Rational Anarchist".

David, my friend. . . I await your rejoinder.

P.S. It occurs to me to add that I think that Heinlein was enough of a Jeffersonian to believe that if you think that Heinlein meant to exclude Jefferson from his definition of "Rational Anarchist" then at the very least you don't have a full appreciation of Heinlein's understanding of what it meant to be a Jeffersonian.

P.P.S. I can find further echoes of brutally (arguably) Jeffersonian Rational Anarchy unsentimentality ("the blood of tyrants and patriots") in Farnham's Freehold re the efficacy of having a periodic culling of the race by catastrophe.

I bow to no one in my sympathetic admiration of Jefferson (and in fact I found to my surprise that when faced with the places and artifacts of the US's founding, it was only the Jefferson relics that brought me to tears). Even knowing all the arguments raised up against him over the centuries - but . . .

It is very, very difficult to consider someone an "anarchist" of any stripe who used the force majeur of the state to effect the Louisiana Purchase, blockade foreign shipping, etc. Whatever Jefferson was -- "Jeffersonian" seems to do it -- anarchist he was not.

And so David's initial criticism seems to me well made.

Actually, I'd say the Louisiana Purchase was *exactly* Rational Anarchy *because* it was "extra-legal". If I'd thought of it myself when writing the above, I would have added it originally.

A man made a major decision for all society and pushed it through absent any clear authority from an external source to do so. If that's not Rational Anarchy, then I'm indeed puzzled.

There is no explicit Force Majeure provision in the US Constitution. While it may be an ancient concept, and has also gained status in US law over time, the founding generation had understood themselves to have created a limited government, and it was by no means readily apparent at the time that Jefferson was acting legally. He walked out on that limb himself by his own internal compass of what was right to do.

I could agree with you that it is a damned odd place for an Anarchist to be --president of a government. Let's see, perhaps you will remind me who the first President of the Luna Free State was? Apparently there is nothing about Rational Anarchy that prohibits a practitioner from serving in such an office when necessity calls. Prof had the good luck to kick the bucket after a few months (I suspect it was a relief to him, frankly) --who knows what uncomfortable positions he would have been forced into addressing if he'd had the 8 years of Jefferson to experience them?

Btw, generally speaking, I personally wouldn't want a Rational Anarchist as president. I'm more a "Rule of Law" kinda guy myself. But of course extraordinary circumstances do arise from time to time. . .

The power of the purse can be pretty limiting.

The reality is the Louisiana Purchase doesn't happen if Jefferson can't bring a majority of Congress along to pay for it. But that he did it on his personal authority and prestige, an authority that was really clear to no one at the time (and still argued about, btw), is clear. Many scholars would point right there for the start of the development of the kind of ill-defined presidential power you're pointing at, but you can't argue backwards from today to say that Jefferson knew he'd get away with it then.

One of the frequent complaints against the US Supreme Court, from that day to this, is that it was/is usually willing to go along with (arguably) unwarranted aggrandisement and expansion of Federal power when faced with a united front from the other two branches. Not always, but usually.

And even when it isn't initially, if pressed over time they will be worn down by death and replacement (the latter controlled by the other two branches). FDR and his congresses did pretty much win, eventually. . . .

Well, I won't say I don't see the argument to be made on the other side here (tho I'll respond at more length this weekend), but given the author chose to put that contention in the mouth of the avatar of the position, I think it is at least as valid an exercise to point out at length what he might have seen to make him do so, as it is to brush him off on that point in a few sentences.

I'll re-read the piece to see if you actually clarify what you see as the differences between a CL and a RA (i.e. what would an RA do that a CL wouldn't?).

It seems to me the willingness to engage in Revolution, or other strenuous forms of civil disobedience, personally at great risk, when personally determined it is indicated, is a pretty major point in that discussion. If you don't agree, then feel free to offer an example where you think you could say "Ahha, he must be an RA because a CL wouldn't do that".

A CL may or may not, even if he thinks it is necessary to achieve the world he thinks is required. An RA *must* --that not all RA end up being Revolutionaries, if they really are RA, should only be because they don't see a Revolution as required in the given circumstance.

There are plenty of CL who think things are going to hell in a handbasket, and doing not all that much about it. A real RA does not have that option --if things are going to hell, it is *his* job, personally, to un-hell them. Edmund Burke, a CL for sure, might possibly have given the best near encapsulation of RA --"All that is necessary for the triumph of evil, is for good men to do nothing". See, the CL thinks that a good man *can* "do nothing" in those circumstances. The RA thinks it is *required* for the "good man" to *do something* if he wants to maintain his "good man" status as an RA.

Frankly, the thought of a densely populated world full of RA scares the bejebus out of me. Constant civil war. A sprinkling of them for "yeast" is about all a dense population could stand.

I'll roll this one along the floor for conversation. . . .

Where CL and RA have commonalities, there are still differences in emphasis.

A CL is trying to create/maintain the conditions where he and his fellow citizens can exercise their rights.

An RA is trying to create/maintain the conditions where he and his fellow citizens can fulfill their responsibilities.

That, often, the same conditions are required for both does not change the difference in emphasis.

Your average Libertarian (honorable exceptions, of course) is a heckuva lot more interested in talking you into the ground about his rights, but usually much less so about his responsibilities.

How does one get "morals" to be "morally responsible" for, David? Btw, changing the tense from responsibilities to responsible doesn't really change anything, does it?

Isn't the "man on the button" example phrased as "responsible" of that particular individual?

If it isn't thru the free flow of information/education that one gets useable morals, then you must be born with an innate sense of right and wrong that can be applied reliably to any situation even in the absence any other enabling factor (like, y'know, comprehensive knowledge of the situation). I can't see a third way. Which answer would Prof give?

Burke, patron saint of the CLs, would answer "God" is a pretty big part of that, meaning the Christian God. Jefferson's answer would have been a lot more squishy.

"Answerability" is a more external metric. I'm not saying RAs aren't willing to be held answerable by that observation, but it is. "Morally respsonsible", the phrase Prof uses in the quote you just quoted, is something else, a much more internal metric. In fact, in general useage you usually see accusations of someone being "morally responsible" when an effort to hold them actually answerable has failed or is likely to fail.

Haven't gotten around to re-reading David's piece yet, then I probably ought to re-read the book again too (oh, cruel fate! ).

I would have to concede that generalizing from one example (in this case Prof) is always a dangerous thing to do. An RA with a very different internal moral compass might produce a very different example.

The thing is, I'm bringing a whole lot more "long-term Heinlein context re duty and social good" to what I'm reading in this area, and while I think that's appropriate to do, it does bring its own dangers as well --maybe *this* time he had something else in mind, or at least more of a variation from his usual.

Bill--

As is sometimes my wont (which you wouldn't get from the original post on this thread!) I shall fire my artillery oblique rather than trying to "Cross your 'T'" (to mix military metaphors).

In the interstitial matter to EU, which we both admire and find consequential for various reasons, there are a series of quotes that appear throughout. A few are inconsequential bon mots of unnamed provenance shown as Batmobile-like bumper stickers. One is a quote from Horace. One is a quote from "Anon.".

Most of the rest are L. Long quotes. Two are not. One is a quote from Bernardo de la Paz, and one is a quote from the fellow Prof cites as one of his original intellectual forebearers --T. Jefferson.

So score is, of Heinlein-created characters, quotes are provided in EU for only two, L. Long and Prof. With an additional quote from Prof's cite that I started this thread over.

It occurs to me to think, re World as Myth, that perhaps Robert just didn't see artistic room for Jubal and Prof both, and chose Jubal to carry the torch, without meaning any disavowal of Prof as a near Heinlein-doppelganger by the choice. If the author did consider that to be the case, there are several characteristics where Jubal would have the edge in such a competition --particularly to be re-introduced in TNOTB, where in retrospect (all those anagrams) the author is trying to rub our noses in how many of the characters are actually the author. . .

How near a doppelganger is Prof? Ahh, a reasonable question, and why it is nice to have a place like this to cross tips over the matter. There is some fairly simple math here, and being simple does not necessarily make it incorrect --if Prof is a Jeffersonian and Heinlein is a Jeffersonian, then perhaps. . . .

The quote from Prof? Well, I'd say that characteristically it is about both freedom and moral responsibility: "Anything you get for free costs more than worth --but you don't find it out until later".

The quote from Jefferson? "I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man."

Yeah, that damn Jefferson, creating ambiguity again (a lot of folks would say the 'altar of God' has created a lot of that tyranny over the mind of man). But still, absent the God bit (a little PR for the masses, or perhaps just a Mighty Oath they would understand as such?), a very RAish internal moral compass kind of thing to say. Surely Robert himself would not have included that quote as a paean to the power of the altar of God in producing victory in such a war.

Oh, and pass me some of that "pink salmon" over there, would you?

I'm actually having a re-read of EU right now, which is why that was an easy analysis to do. . . but having got back to it after the above, noticed that there are two Harshaw quotes --on facing pages-- I had missed the first time flipping thru. Still, I don't think that hurts the case. Long, Harshaw, de la Paz --looks like the company I'd expect Prof to be keeping.

Lazarus certainly helps fulfill that role. He cheats. Even after he gets caught. . . the second or third time.

If I line the three of them up, on a linear scale with, "do whatever it takes" on the far left, something like a balance of action/larger (than self) morality in the middle, and intellectual wisdom on the far right. . . .I line them up Lazarus, Prof, and Jubal.

Perhaps that isn't quite the right way to deliniate the scale, but hopefully you get the sense of what I mean there. In my estimation, Prof has a lot more in common with either of them than the other two do with each other. That kind of calculation could have left him odd man out. Prof and Lazarus interacting much, or Prof and Jubal interacting much, might have been a bit blurry.